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Abstract 1 
 2 
This paper is an independent review of the travel demand management (TDM) program for the 2012 3 
London Summer Olympic Games including the official TDM plan and a discussion of the undocumented, 4 
but highly influential, aspects of the “big scare” effect.   5 
The games were one of the largest in history with over 20M additional trips expected in a city 6 
renowned for significant daily travel congestion.  It included the largest (108 mile) network of Olympic 7 
Lanes removing a traffic lane for Olympic vehicles over a large proportion of inner London’s roads.   The 8 
TDM program was the largest in history costing £30M and included extensive advertising, travel planning 9 
covering 611,000 employees, new trip planning web tools and 107M travel advice emails.  This and a 10 
substantial transit development program aimed to emphasise transit use and encourage reductions in base 11 
load travel to increase capacity for games travel.   12 
The TDM program warned Londoners to change travel for the games.  This, a range of 13 
(probably?) unplanned events and media ‘hysteria’ prior to the games acted to enhance the ‘big scare’ 14 
effect. 15 
The games-time impact on travel was impressive.  Around 20M (+30%) additional transit trips 16 
resulted while road travel reduced by 10%-30%.  A 26% change in resident travel occurred including  20% 17 
travel reduction and 13% change (retiming 6%, reroute 4% and remode 3%).  Significantly games-time 18 
media reporting was highly positive.  Business surveys corroborate these findings; employee attendance 19 
reduced by 30% and show a strong preference for commute reduction and retiming.  20 
Implications for policy/future research are identified. 21 
 22 
Abstract = 249 words (limit = 250 words) 23 
 24 
 25 
 26 
 27 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The London 2012 Summer Olympic Games (SOG) was one of the largest in history and presented London with 
the biggest travel demand challenge ever experienced in a western world “mega city”.  Some 20M additional 
visitor trips were expected in a city which is already considered to be widely congested [1].   In addition a 
dedicated transport system for the Olympic Family (athletes, media and officials) of some 55,000 people (also 
the largest in history) required removal of some 108 miles of roadspace for the Olympic Route Network in some 
of the city’s most congested locations [1, 2] 
Research and practice demonstrates that Travel Demand Management is an essential requirement for 
managing travel demand challenges in congested cities facing increased travel demand of this scale [3, 4].   In 
congested high demand contexts TDM acts “to reduce the number of vehicles using the road system while 
providing a wide variety of mobility options to those who wish to travel” [5].   In the Olympic context critical 
strategies involve influencing the mode and time of travel and in particular, acting to reduce ‘base load’ travel 
demand to enable greater capacity to cater for special event travel [4].  For the London 2012 Games there was a 
requirement to reduce the base load on both the road network and the transit system1. 
The London 2012 TDM program was the largest ever developed for a specific event.  Costing some 
£30M [6] it included TDM planning for businesses representing over 611,000 employees, new web tools for trip 
planning of over 63M trips and some 107M travel advice emails.   
The paper presents an ‘independent’ review of the TDM program adopted for the 2012 SOG2.  An 
independent perspective allows us to discuss aspects of the program which are sensitive for 
authorities/Government yet are essential in understanding real performance and outcomes.  The paper outlines 
the official strategy adopted but also includes a review of less widely acknowledged features of the ‘big scare’ 
and how this effect was manifest during London 2012.  It then reviews the impacts demonstrated on the scale of 
travel in London using a synthesis of reports during the games,  an assembly of available official statistics and a 
series of independent business monitoring studies undertaken by the researchers during the games. 
The paper commences with a review of the Research Context, including a short review of the research 
literature on TDM and large special events, an outline of the London 2012 games and its TDM program and a 
discussion of ‘the big scare’ and how it is thought to have been apparent during the games.  TDM impact data is 
then summarised including a summary of pre-games/games time reports, a summary of available official data 
and a summary of the impact of business surveys undertaken as part of the research.  The paper concludes with a 
discussion of key lessons learned for futures games and for managing congestion in cities generally. 
 
RESEARCH CONTEXT 
 
Research Literature 
 
The SOG lasts for only 16 days and hence does not require longer term land use based TDM measures however 
aspects of some of these are developed in ‘legacy projects’ projects developed for the games which have longer 
term benefits for the city [7].    Major elements of the TDM programs for the games involve a range of measures 
including: 
A. Travel capacity creation measures – to reduce demand using a wide range of measures such as timing major 
events at weekends or public holidays, car restrictions or employee vacation encouragement. 
B. Travel behaviour change (or marketing) measures - that aim to reduce travel or change travel mode to a 
more efficient means, such as transit or higher-occupancy vehicles.  Travel warnings, advice and planning 
travel with business are examples of these. 
C. Traffic efficiency measures – to improve traffic flow/delays such as adjusting traffic signal settings to 
maximise capacity and parking bans and tow truck use 
D. Traffic bans – to remove or exclude traffic 
E. Transit emphasis measures – which aim to encourage higher-capacity and  more efficient modes to carry 
large volumes of travellers such as rail transit. 
[4] 
 
As Table 1 illustrates, in previous games, the travel behaviour change measures incorporated in these programs 
have proven highly successful in reducing ‘base load’ travel demand and thus acting to increase the available 
capacity to handle additional Olympic generated  travel. 
 
                                                          
1 London is already well known for use of TDM notably the road ‘congestion pricing’ scheme in use in central London.    
2 The focus of this research is on the Olympic games rather than the Paralympics. 
Currie, Jones and Woolley 
4 
 
TABLE I – Summary of Estimated of Base Load Demand Reduction – Olympic Games 
 
Location/Year System Wide Impact 
Beijing 2008 • Traffic volumes fell by 21% and average speed increased 27% 
• Total urban VKT dropped 32%  & speed increase 25km/h  to 37km/h 
Athens 2004 • 30% reduction in traffic levels on main roads 
Salt Lake City 2002 • Downtown traffic down 30% to 40% from normal levels 
Sydney 2000 • Road traffic volumes reduced by 10%-20% of normal weekday levels 
• Sydney general traffic decreased by 20%; 15%-20% daily traffic reduction 
Atlanta 1996 • Weekday total 24 h traffic counts decreased by 2.8%. 
Barcelona 1992 • 15%–20% reduction in congestion 
Los Angeles 1984 • 4% background reduction on highways 
Source: [4] 
 
Overall this demonstrates that despite significant additional Olympics related travel, TDM programs in previous 
games have acted to reduce not increase road traffic levels.  These have been particularly successful  in the 
games held since 1996 with broad estimates of traffic reduction of between 20% and 30%. 
London 2012 and the TDM Program 
The London 2012 games was one of the largest in history by many measures: 
• Some 7.4M ticket sales are quoted [8].    This compares to 8.7M in Atlanta, 6.7M Sydney and 6.5M Beijing. 
• The size of the Olympic Family for London 2012 has been quoted at 55,000 [1] and also 77,000 [9].  The 
next largest are 50,000 Beijing, 46,000 Athens and 39,500 Barcelona [3]. 
 
Figure 1 shows the expected travel demand forecast by day of the games by London 2012 planners. 
 
 
FIGURE 1 – Forecast Transit Demand – Background (line) and Olympic Related (bars) – London 2012 
 
Background transit travel demand is typically broadly 7.7M per weekday falling to 3.4m on Sunday.  Olympic 
related demands are highest on weekends where the larger events are deliberately scheduled to ensure transport 
capacity is available.  Weekday Olympic travel was estimated at between 0.8 and 1.3M.  The largest total 
expected demand is Day 7 and Day 11 with around 9M transit trips including both background and Olympic 
demand.   Overall during the Olympics some 20M additional transit trips were expected in the modelling.   
The TDM program associated with the games employed measures in each of the categories A to E (see 
above) however a considerable range of new and innovate approaches were also adopted.  Figure 2 illustrates the 
measures adopted in both the overall transport strategy and the games TDM program in particular.   
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As with all games, expansion of urban transit was a major part of the conventional transport plan.  This included 
some £15B investment program, with strong legacy benefits, on projects including the new Javelin high speed 
train,  London Underground and Dockland Light Railway enhancements  [10]3.   
 
 
 
FIGURE 2 – Transport Strategy Measures Including TDM Measures (Highlighted) – London 2012 
Note: Developed from ideas presented in Springett [1] 
 
Central to the TDM program was an innovative marketing and awareness campaign using advanced web tools 
and visualisation methods to explain predicted likely games congestion on a day by day basis and to 
communicate this to potential travellers.  The ‘Keep Ahead of the Games’ website actively sought participation 
from residents to help them understand how the games would affect travel and encouraged changing behaviour 
“to reduce their overall need to travel or re-time, re-route or revise their mode of travel”, [1].   Promotion using a 
range of media advertising reinforced this message assisted by widespread and intense media coverage with a 
consistent message that travel during the games were going to be very difficult. 
One of the largest ‘advice to business’ campaigns was also undertaken as part of the games TDM 
program.    This included widespread web based and post out advertising to businesses informing them about the 
games (42,000 packages of information were mailed to London businesses and over a million business 
newsletters were sent), numerous workshops and public presentations to business groups (21,786  businesses 
attended presentations) and a large program of individual travel planning activities for targeted  businesses.  The 
latter covered larger businesses (representing 611,000 employees)  Some 20,000  smaller and medium sized 
employers were visited by TDM representatives at games hotspots [1]. 
 
The ‘Big Scare’ and London 2012 
 
The ‘Big Scare’ refers to the process of constructively influencing travel behaviour choices by reinforcing 
natural apprehensions which local residents have about the ‘chaos’ which the games might create for travel and 
business [4, 12].   Figure 3 illustrates the concept. 
                                                          
3 Note:  £6.5B investment is quoted for Transport for London for transport improvements 8. Transport for London, 
London 2012 Games Transport - Performance, Funding and Legacy. 2012, Transport for London,: London, UK.  A 
House of Commons review states that a long term £17B was allocated by ODA for the games 11. Butcher, L., 
London Olympic 2012: transport. 2012, Library of the House of Commons, UK: London, Uk.. 
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FIGURE 3 – Concept of the ‘Big Scare’ impact on Event Transport Congestion 
 
The central outcome of the big scare is people avoiding travel in busy areas/time and even residents leaving the 
city to avoid problems.  This results in acceptable or manageable levels of urban travel congestion.  A significant 
part of the big scare is the role the media plays.  The games is essentially a world media event, paid 
for/sponsored by major international media agencies.  Pre-games a very large share of the worlds media is sent to 
host cities with the objective to identify stories to broadcast.  Because the games are not running, it is common 
for the media to focus on planning and transport as news subjects.  These stories tend to focus on negative issues 
because they are considered ‘news worthy’.  Typically they emphasise stories of expected ‘chaos’ in the pre-
games period. 
The London 2012 authorities were very aware of the ‘big scare’ concept in developing plans for the 
games however were understandably reluctant to acknowledge any pro-active approaches adopted to create and 
manage the ‘big scare’ effect.   It is therefore impossible to understand exactly how, and even if, active ‘big 
scare’ tactics were employed.  Discussion on these approaches thus involves a degree of conjecture.  What is 
certain is that the TDM program actively promoted ‘hot spots’ of intensive expected congestion on both the road 
and transit network and educated business and the public about the transport challenges which would be faced.    
Press alerts and media commentary by London 2012 authorities all actively reinforced these messages which 
were willingly passed on and emphasised by a media industry eager for stories to tell. 
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Interviews conducted with London businesses undertaken as part of this research4 identified parts of the 
TfL Business engagement program that could be regarded as contributing the “big scare’.   Businesses reported 
considerable confusion as to the length of time that the road restrictions would be in place, with some referring 
to a possible 100 days of disruption. A representative of a wholesale trader in London stated ; 
 “The fact that the roads are going to be restricted for 100 days, it would have a devastating effect. It 
will be a very very sad day if the outcome of the Olympics was to do something that two world wars 
could not do; close the market”   
 
This confusion resulted in businesses actively contacting TfL for advice. If this misinformation was not 
intentional it had the effect of engaging business in TfL’s TDM measures. Once the true length of restrictions 
were understood businesses became more compliant; 
‘When it [the ORN] was relaxed down to 2 days before and two days after the Olympics everyone 
breathed a sigh of relief , it is not a problem we can cope with it”           
   (Manager Road Haulage company) 
 
  
Variable messaging and variable rules for Olympic Route Network operations increased confusion about road 
travel – this almost certainly increased anxiety about travel by road during the games 
 
 
 
 
How are motorists supposed to deal 
with this Olympic Lane 
Configuration? A bus lane (right) is 
not open for traffic use and the 
Olympic lane will also be closed at 
selected times.  Does it imply the 
road is closed?  This road received 
much media coverage and acted to 
increase anxiety about road travel 
during the games more generally 
 
FIGURE 4 – Confusing London Olympic Route Network Operations – Did this increase resident anxiety 
and was it a deliberate ‘big scare’ strategy? 
                                                          
4 A semi-structured interview program was used including 30 interviews covering before/after games time in 2012. 
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What is unclear is whether wider apprehensions about the impact of the games were actively managed.  A central 
cause of public comment and anxiety pre-games was the uncertainty sounding the Olympic Route Network 
(ORN – reserving a road lane for use by Olympic Family vehicles).  The network included ‘Core Routes’, 
‘Venue Specific’, ‘Training Specific’ and ‘Alternative’ routes [2].  There was a fair degree of variation in the 
timing of both what dates routes were operational and also what times of day they would be in operation.  
London 2012 was the first time that temporary variable message signing was used to indicate when routes were 
running and when they were not (see Figure 4).  The outcome was a great deal of uncertainty about which roads 
would be available for general travel and if indeed travel was possible.  Certainly pre-games, much media 
attention (see later) focussed on traffic congestion caused by traffic avoiding olympic lanes that were not  yet 
closed to general traffic and the disruption road closures would cause.  It is also true that highly media worthy 
protests by the on-road transport industry (mainly taxis) were in response to the ORN and its scale.  It is also true 
that during the games only a small share of the ORN was actually in operation5.  It is pure speculation to suggest 
this confusion was actively designed as part of a ‘big scare’ program.  However it is certain that the confusion 
that resulted acted to increase anxiety and influenced travel demand to reduce road travel.  It is also fair to 
comment that media ‘hype’ about transport ‘chaos’ also acted to influence respondent perceptions of the games.   
 
 
TDM IMPACT 
 
Pre-Games/Games Reporting 
 
Table 3 presents a summary of major selected press/media reporting pre-games and during games time.  Pre-
games media was focussed around reporting of ‘transport chaos’.  The closure of the M4 due to unexpected 
roadworks was a highlight, resulting traffic congestion in central London and its reporting was common.  There 
was also much reporting of confusion amongst motorists regarding the opening times of Olympic Lanes.  As 
shown in Figure 4, this reached national television media with live coverage of some resulting road delays.   
Very ‘media worthy’ protests were made by the London taxi industry regarding olympic lanes (Figure 5).    
These acted to enhance an already common view that ‘chaos’ is likely. 
 
 
Live national Skye TV reports of traffic congestion 
caused by Olympic lanes despite these not not being 
open yet. 
 
Taxi drivers close Tower Bridge in protest 
 
TV News Broadcast 
 
FIGURE 5 – Selected ‘Chaos’ Based Images from the Pre-Games Media 
                                                          
5 BBC report (8th August) a claim from Garrett Emerson, CEO of TfL Surface Transport that only 25% of Olympic Lanes 
were in operation.  Other media support comments that much of the ORN was not needed due to lower than expected 
road travel demand.  Post games TfL report an average games 60% availability of the ORN. 
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TABLE 2 – Major Media Reports – Pre- Games and Games Time 
 
Pre-Games Games Time 
12-7 • M4 Road cracks closes Londons busiest road – 
opens after a week of closure 
Day 0 
27-07 
• Olympic Transport to/from Opening Ceremony 
works well 
13-07 • Rail union ballots members about a strike during the 
game 
Day 1 
Saturday 
• Research Group Experian say customer footfall in 
central London shops down 10% sat 
16-07 • M4 32 Mile tailbacks due to ‘Games Lanes’ opening 
today as a major accident also occurred – Highways 
agency says it was only a crash and delays were 
minor. TfL says traffic in London is 10% down. 
• Some ‘games lanes’ thought to be causing delays 
(A4) though not opened yet (fully operational by 
25th).  Drivers don’t understand rules.   
• Reports of athlete buses (USA and Australia team) 
getting lost   
Day 2 
29-07 
Sunday 
• Londoners warned of big delays on first 
weekday/Monday – London bridge on Monday eve 
closed for many commuter trains e.g. Sussex train 
Day 3 
30-07 
Monday 
• Many reports of PT working very smoothly;  trains 
buses very quiet; tube/trains fantastic – some 
commuters complain they get to work too early 
• Tweet – “Is it just me or is transit actually quieter 
than normal? Can we host the Olympic Games 
more often please” 
• Many Olympic lanes reopened to general traffic 
because of low Games Transport use;  Officials say 
they are using PT 
17-07 • Over 200 Taxi cabs block traffic to stage protest in 
Parliament Square about not being allowed to drive 
in Games Lanes. 
• Brent Transport Action Group calls on TfL to 
ensure needs of disabled people are catered for 
during the games 
Day 4 
31-07 
• Experian figures on retail footfall (Monday/Tuesday 
– East London -9.6%  West End -4.53% 
18-07 • London bus workers accept an offer not to strike.  
Extra pay for Olympic work. 
• Opening ceremony to be shortened due to possible 
problems if it runs late  
• 13,000 traffic lights have been reprogrammed to 
increase traffic flow.  Complaints in Wandsworth 
that this causing traffic queues.   
Day 5 
1-08 
Weds 
• “London Ghost Town” reports - Tourist trade/ 
retailers report lack of trade - Tour Operators 
Assoc. says visitors down 50% -  major tourist 
venue visits down 30%-35%  - 
• “the negative publicity around transit has been very 
effective, but probably too effective” (Capital 
retailers) 
•  Experian report store visits fell on last year Day 0 -
10.4% Day 1 -11.6% 
• Mayor removes travel warning messages from tube 
trains  
• 1.5m workers stay at home to stop London seizing 
up  
19-07 • Blown fuses and signalling problems near London 
Bridge delay rail into city from South. 
• East Midlands train drivers to stage 3 day strike 
during games (Aug 6-8th) 
20-07 • Reports resident ‘getaway’ begins – 482K leave 
Heathrow & 50K Channel Tunnel in next 2 days 
• Ramadan  to cause chaos during games – 250K live 
around Olympic park where there are 100 mosques , 
3K Olympians are Muslim – road congestion to 
result 
• Taxis and cyclists complain about not being to use 
Olympic (zil) lanes 
Day 6 
Thursday 
• More stories of decline in visits/trade – Cabbie says 
trade -25% others -20-40% 
Day 7 
3-08 
Friday 
• Transport busy but working; Javelin wait time 
queue of 30/60 mins reported 
• Reports of London Ghost Town – Trade 
associations claim tourist attractions -30% on last 
year  Restaurants/cabs  -40%   
• Roads unexpectedly roomy 
23-07 • Faults causes tube DLR delays 
• Numerous traffic delays reported as work continues 
to put in Olympic lanes  
• Unions (RMT) say they will strike over lack of 
Olympic bonus 
Day 8 
4-08 
Saturday  
• Commuter Group ‘Travelwatch’ give capital 
transport operators ‘vote of confidence’ for games 
transport.  “transport operators have excelled 
themselves” – many other positive transport 
working stories 
24-07 • Opening ceremony rehearsal has many delays  
• Foreign athletes complain about long travel times on 
Olympic lanes to outlying venues 
• Long delays at St Pancras 6-7 min trip turns into 50 
min on Javelin train.  
Day 9 
5-08 
 Sunday 
• Week in review story says “Transport for London 
can take a bow” 
• More concerns on low trade in London;  reports 
footfall -20% in West End 
• Reports of rush hour starting much earlier 
25-07 • Confusion surrounds games lanes; people not using 
them but they are empty 
• Cable cars break down;  travellers left sweltering 
(affects dozens i.e. not many) 
• Olympic road restrictions begin in full.  Queues and 
delays reported around lanes. 
• Taxi drivers protest by filling Tower Bridge with 
taxis;  driver leaps off into Thames as a protest 
Day 10 • Few transport reports 
Day 11 • Many reports transport working well 
Day 12 • Many reports transport working well 
• Olympic athletes reported using transit and not 
Olympic lanes 
Day 13 • General press reports highly positive on travel 
impacts 
26-07 • Funeral directors say horse drawn hearses may 
protest Olympic lanes by travelling in them 
• Fed of small  business says Olympic Lanes bad for 
business and ask for compensation 
Day 
14/15 
• Positive Press reports, record highs in transit usage 
claimed 
Day 16 • Independent review of all games outcomes 
including transport very positive  
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Pre-games reporting contrasts with a consistent message of generally very good transport system performance 
during the games.    Day 3, the first commuting Monday of the games is full of media reports of good transport 
outcomes.  Some commuters ‘complain’ of arriving to work too early and there is one ‘tweet’ from a commuter 
noting how quiet London is during the games and requesting “Can we host the Olympic Games more often 
please?”.    Indeed the reduction in activity proves alarming for business interests in London.  From day 1  
reports of below average visitation are made with a common ‘mantra’ of the media being the ‘London Ghost 
Town’ label.    By the second working day of the games there are press reports that the ORN is being made 
available for wider use because traffic volumes are down (see later).  Concerns by business interests on lack of 
trade are reported to result in removal of warning messages by the Mayor Boris Johnson on the transit address 
systems about transport (however this is denied in reports by authorities.  Transport advocacy groups give good 
‘report cards’ about transport performance of authorities and transport.   To quote the ‘Independent’ newspaper 
(28-08-2012) in its review of the games performance “the overriding story has been one of surprised Londoners 
and spectators finding their way around with remarkable ease”.  
 
Official Monitoring Data 
 
Table 3 presents a summary of reported transport outcomes during the games with specific reference to transit 
ridership and road travel demand6. 
 
TABLE 3 – Reported Games Times Transport Outcomes – TfL 
 
Day Transit Roads Day Transit Roads 
0  Traffic -15% on last year 10 More record Tube ridership reports  2  Traffic -30% on last year 
3 Tube +7.5%  DLR +65% 490K – record ridership  11 
LUL carrys 4.5M trips;   
highest in history  
4 Tube +4%   Traffic -20% on last year 
12 
Emirates Air Line 
(cable car over the 
Thames) has taken 
500K riders in its first 6 
weeks since opening. 
Only 25% of ORN is 
currently active 
Only 300 ORN fines 
issued in first 8 days; 
98% compliance 
(congestion charge has 
3,000 fines day) 
5 
Record LUL ridership 
4.25M vs 3.7M last year 
(+15%) 
 
6 
Record LUL ridership 
4.31M vs 3.8M last year 
(+13%) 
 13 
4.52M carried on LUL 
today same as record 
made Thursday 
 
7 
LUL ridership 4.4M +20% 
higher than last year   
London Overground +27% 
on same week last year 
Only 40% of games 
lanes in operation 
14 
Over first 12 days of 
games LUL carried 
47M up 30% from 
11.05M same period 
last year.  Last Sunday 
Tube up 77% on last 
year (note earlier said it 
was 22%) 
 
8 
Busiest Saturday ever – 
LUL 3.74M journeys up 
11% on previous records 
achieved last weekend  
 
9 
Sun Tube busiest weekend 
ever – 3.2 journeys up 22% 
on previous records 
 
15 
over first 13 days LUL 
carries 51.47M up 
12.29M last year 
(+31.4%) 
 
16 
TfL says 60M LUL 
trips, up 30% on normal 
levels – DLR 6 M trips, 
up 100% - Overground 
6M trips up 47% 
 
Note: Weekend Days are Shaded.  Data from TfL press releases, back dated to days when ridership reports 
relate to .  LUL=London Underground Limited, TfL=Transport for London 
 
The general picture presented in one of record high increases in transit usage and a decline in road traffic 
demand.  Overall (day 16),  TfL reports London Underground travel is up 30% whilst the overground rail service 
is up 47%.  Dockland Light Railway, a much smaller rail service than the others, carried double its usual number 
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of passengers.  Road traffic data is more patchy; reports are from earlier days in the games and suggest road 
traffic level decline of between 15% and 30%. 
The post games reviews of transport performance quote the following outcomes: 
• Some 35% of regular travellers changed their travel during the games period [13]. 
• Surveys undertaken during the games (The “Journey Maker” Surveys) established that: 
- 36% changed travel behaviour each weekday 
- 20% “reduced” travel and 13% changed travel.  The latter  included “retimed”; 6% “rerouted”; 4% 
and “re:mode” or changed mode; 3%  [14] 
• Tube journeys totalled 62M (up 35%), Rail overground totalled 6.4M journeys (up 26%),  London Buses 
92M and DLR 6.9M (up 100%). 
• Central and Inner London Traffic flows were down 16.3% in the a.m. peak, 9.4% p.m. peak.  Records for 
serious and severe traffic disruption were down 20% 
• Games family vehicles are reported to have achieved an average 30% reduced travel time compared to 
normal day travel speeds 
• An estimated 60% of Olympic Route Network roads remained open to all traffic during the games.   [8] 
• Regarding success factors TFL noted the following: 
 
“One of the key reasons the transport network operated so smoothly during the 
London 2012 Games was that businesses and many Londoners followed the advice 
of TfL, London 2012 and transport partners to change the way they travelled during 
the Games, thereby avoiding the busiest times and places.” 
          [14, p18] 
 
Impact on Business Research  
 
During 2012 the authors conducted a series of consultations with the London business community to explore 
their attitudes to the games.  This included collation of data on staff attendance rates at major employment sites  
and a survey of both larger and smaller employers to understand plans and outcomes of the games on employee 
and customer access. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 6 – Major Employment Site Attendance During the Games 
 
Figure 6 illustrates office employee occupancy levels pre and during games time for major selected employers in 
the Canary Wharf area.  Interestingly pre-games, occupancy levels were already 8-22% below normal weekday 
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levels.  During games time however, employee office site attendance was 27%-30% below normal levels.  
Discussions with the employers involved identified an active promotion of ‘work at home’ strategies, a policy of 
discouraging guest visits as well encouraging vacation during games time.  These were consistent with the 
London 2012 TDM program of individual consultations which were adopted in all the sites concerned.   Limited 
data on visitor numbers at employee sites was also available, however site visitors is a very small relative to 
employee occupancy.  This show larger reductions during games time for site visitors (compared to the previous 
year).  There were around the 80% range for Canary Wharf and around 30% for the City of London. 
To examine the games impact on employment (commuter) travel and also travel of business customers, 
a series of web based travel surveys were undertaken as part of the research to establish pre-games intentions and 
post-games outcomes.    The web based survey was promoted through a series of business associations.   A 
major sampling aim was to cover smaller business and well as larger groups.  Table 4 shows the resulting sample 
size based on the employee sizes of the businesses covered. 
 
TABLE 4 – Pre-Post Games Business Impact Survey – Sampling 
 
Business Size Pre-Games Post-Games Total 
Smaller (<250 
employees) 
153 257 410 
Larger (250 employees 
and larger 
11,998 1,125 13,123 
Total 12,151 1,382 13,532 
Note: based on mid range estimates of size of employees, these were sampled by category of size to 
ensure privacy of respondents.  No employers were sampled both pre and post games. 
 
Overall employers sampled represent some 13,500 employees mostly surveyed during the pre-games period.     
Analysis establish little differences in pre-games and post games outcomes from the survey which explored: 
• Approaches to learning about travel during the games 
• Planning approaches, if any adopted 
• How the games affected business activity 
• Activities to plan for employee access 
• Activities to plan for customer access 
• Overall views of the games. 
 
Analysis did however find some significant differences between responses in smaller and larger businesses. 
Some 80% of business surveyed stated they had been contacted by games authorities and informed 
about the games.  All of the larger enterprises said they had been contacted and assisted in developing plans 
whilst only 57% of smaller enterprises believed that this was the case.  Larger businesses also emphasised the 
use of business associations as a means of understanding how the games would impact on them.  Some 78% of 
business overall said they had a formal plan for the games with no real difference as a result by business size. 
Figure 7 (top) shows the response for how the games affected businesses.  The largest overall concern 
of business was customer access and deliveries however, larger businesses were particularly concerned about 
employee access.  Smaller businesses were more concerned than large businesses that employees taking leave 
could affect their business and also that customers might be harder to contact. 
Overall some 41% of business surveyed believed/found business impacts of the games to be neutral,  
29% thought it would be negative whilst 24% positive.  Larger business considered impacts to be neutral whilst 
smaller businesses were more evenly divided (about a third said impacts would be positive, neutral or negative). 
Figure 7 (mid) shows the activities undertaken to plan for employee access during the games.  Retiming 
commute trips and working from home were the most common responses however smaller businesses did not 
tend to encourage employees to work from home.  Larger businesses, who were more directly engaged by the 
travel planning teams as part of the TDM program, also tended to encourage trips by different modes, routes and 
also the retiming of deliveries.  General reductions in business trips as part of work was also more common. 
Smaller businesses tended to ask staff to take leave compared to larger enterprises.  They also encouraged the 
use of alternative modes of travel for business journeys and a share had actually closed down their business as a 
response to the impacts of the games. 
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FIGURE 7 – How will/did the games affect business activities – Business Survey Responses 
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Figure 7 (bottom) shows the activities undertaken by business in terms of managing customer 1 
access.    On average, half of the businesses surveyed were not planning or did not undertake any activities 2 
to address concerns of customer access.  Some 57% of larger business in particular did not have any plans 3 
for customer access.    In general, smaller businesses undertook more activities to ensure customer access 4 
than larger businesses.  Delaying customer access until post-games times and suggesting customers access 5 
their business by alternative modes of transport were common strategies for smaller businesses. 6 
The survey also asked respondents if they thought the games were good for London.  Some 86% 7 
agreed/strongly agreed (100% of larger business).  Some smaller businesses didn’t know.  Asked if 8 
transport infrastructure for the games would have ‘legacy’ benefits, 38% said neither yes or no while 32% 9 
agreed and 23% disagreed.  Smaller businesses were generally more neutral on the issue (50%) than larger 10 
business (29%). 11 
 12 
 13 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 14 
 15 
This paper is an independent review of the TDM program adopted for the 2012 SOG.     The expected size 16 
of games was very large with over 20M additional trips expected in a city which is already considered to be 17 
congested.  In addition, as part of its contract with the International Olympic Committee to hold the games, 18 
London committed to operating a large (108 miles) network of Olympic Lanes, which involved removing a 19 
lane of traffic for Olympic Family priority vehicles.   The TDM program developed to manage this demand 20 
was the largest in history and cost some £30M.   Combined with a large transit development program it 21 
aimed to emphasise transit use for visitors to the Games and to encourage reductions in base load travel, 22 
both on the road and transit  network to increase capacity for games related travel. 23 
 Leading up to the games, the travel advice program warned Londoners to change travel.  This and 24 
a series of events including road closures and protests acted to encourage a “hysterical” attitude within the 25 
media which suggested that the games was going to very bad in terms of travel and congestion.  A 26 
significant ‘big scare’ effect was apparent.   27 
Overall the available outcome data points to a highly successful TDM program impact.  Around 28 
20M (+30%) additional trips on transit resulted and road travel reduced in the 10%-30% range.  The TDM 29 
team data suggest a weekday 36% change in resident travel habits including a 20% travel reduction and a 30 
13% trips adjustment (6% retiming, 4% reroute and 3% remode).  Significantly the general media reporting 31 
of the games period was highly positive.  32 
The business travel data collated as part of this research generally corroborates these findings 33 
however a 30% employee attendance reduction was found suggesting a higher impact on trip reduction for 34 
commuters.  Overall the available data is consistent with the 20%-30% levels of trip reduction 35 
demonstrated in other recent games.   36 
The major lesson learned from this research is that Travel Demand Management can be highly 37 
effective at reducing base load travel freeing up transport capacity to carry significant additional demands.    38 
This is an important lesson because it has implications for congested cities facing significant growth 39 
pressures as well as for host cities managing event travel for 16 days of the games.  In the context of the 40 
£15B  invested in transport infrastructure for the games, the £30M cost of the TDM program seems good 41 
value for money relative to its achievements.   Certainly the designers and managers of the program have 42 
demonstrated considerable innovation (and flare) in the program.  The use of transport modelling detailing 43 
the impact of TDM on reducing congestion to actively inform travellers decisions, including real time 44 
information, is likely to find its way into day to day travel in cities worldwide. 45 
The scale and flexible management of the London 2012 Olympic Route Network was also an 46 
innovative, first ever used, feature of the 2012 games.  This paper has questioned whether this might not 47 
have been a pro-active means of management of the ‘big scare’ effect.  This is pure speculation and the 48 
truth of this may never be known.  What is clear however is that its scale and the way it was managed acted 49 
to increase anxiety about road travel during the games and it most certainly acted to increase the ‘big scare ‘ 50 
effect. So is this an appropriate innovation for future games travel?  To some extent the use of Olympic 51 
lanes is now a mandatory part of a host city Olympic contract.    It is the use of variable message signs 52 
enabling flexible use of the lanes which must be explored further.    On balance it makes good sense for 53 
authorities to retain flexibility in managing an event with so many uncertainties.    By operating a flexible 54 
policy, authorities retained an ability to maintain an effective Olympic Family transport system even if road 55 
travel demand was not reduced.    The confusion generated by flexible use of the network may be seen as 56 
regrettable, in causing delays, but also as fortuitous, in reducing road travel by either encouraging travel by 57 
other modes or reducing total travel demand.   Flexible use of lanes may also be seen as a means of 58 
matching user needs to the situations that develop.   From this perspective it seems like retaining flexibility 59 
is important in matching needs to capacity and in retaining some resilience in transport system integrity in 60 
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situations of uncertainty.    There is however some scope to remove confusion by more clearly 1 
communicating Olympic Lane availability to users.  More uniform commencement dates and uniform start 2 
and finish times may assist in this regard. 3 
This paper is one of the first to discuss the ‘big scare’ effect in more depth.  Anyone aware of 4 
events leading up to the games cannot question that this effect was occurring yet authorities are naturally 5 
reluctant to admit to promoting the ‘big scare’  or encouraging it in any way.  Nevertheless it was 6 
encouraged, if not by plans then certainly by events.  An eager media for stories prior to the games was 7 
another key driver.  This is both a problem but also a significant opportunity for games planners seeking to 8 
reduce base load travel and ‘manage expectations’.  Future games planners would be wise to understand the 9 
power of the ‘big scare’  but should also understand public sensitivities.  Residents don’t want to be 10 
manipulated but they also don’t want a grid locked city or a poorly performing Olympic spectacle. Using 11 
media to encourage positive behavioural reinforcement is appropriate whenever possible.    12 
Are there any conclusions we might draw from these results for smaller scale major events?  Even 13 
small events can require TDM notably at congestion points/times.  London 2012 illustrates well the 14 
possible approaches.  Media is a cheap and powerful means to influence behaviours hence can be adopted 15 
in even small events.  While small events may lack critical mass for media coverage, a focus on congestion 16 
locations would be appropriate in most cases. 17 
Are there any wider, non Olympic, lessons from the London 2012 experience for managing future 18 
congestion in international cities facing significant growth?   The power of behaviour change as a tool to 19 
reduce travel demand seems particularly relevant.   However can an effect demonstrated over 16 days be 20 
extended indefinitely?  The post games review [13] identified that 15% of regular travellers who changed 21 
travel during the games have sustained that travel after the games (equivalent to about 11% of total regular 22 
travellers in London).  This acts to demonstrate how pro-active planning can act to manage travel in cities 23 
The requirement for restrictions/reductions in road traffic, the benefits of spreading demand as a result of 24 
retiming transit and increases in transit travel in general should be a lesson for all congested cities facing 25 
urban growth into the future. 26 
 27 
 28 
 29 
ACKOWLEDGEMENTS 30 
 31 
The authors would like to thank a wide range of individuals and authorities for assistance in conducting this 32 
research.  Special thanks go to Clare Springett,  Hugh Sumner,  Helen Ramsden, Bayo Dosunmu,  Simon 33 
Camm and John Landels for sharing sensitive information during times of difficult work pressures.   We 34 
would also like to thank the London Chamber of Commerce and Industry, MWB Business Exchange and 35 
each of the London Businesses who agreed to take part in the research.   Also Alexa Delbosc of Monash 36 
University for assistance in business survey management.  We would also like to thank the paper reviewers 37 
for their comments and suggestions.  38 
 39 
 40 
LIST OF FIGURES 41 
 42 
FIGURE 1 – Forecast Transit Demand – Background and Olympic Related – London 2012 43 
FIGURE 2 – Transport Strategy Measures Including TDM Measures (Highlighted) – London 2012 44 
FIGURE 3 – Concept of the ‘Big Scare’ impact on Event Transport Congestion 45 
FIGURE 4 – Confusing London Olympic Route Network Operations – Did this increase resident anxiety 46 
and was it a deliberate ‘big scare’ strategy? 47 
FIGURE 5 – Selected ‘Chaos’ Based Images from the Pre-Games Media 48 
FIGURE 6 – Major Employment Site Attendance During the Games 49 
FIGURE 7 – How will/did the games affect business activities 50 
 51 
LIST OF TABLES 52 
 53 
TABLE I – Summary of Estimated of Base Load Demand Reduction – Olympic Games 54 
TABLE 2 – Major Media Reports – Pre- Games and Games Time 55 
TABLE 3 – Reported Games Times Transport Outcomes – TfL 56 
TABLE 4 – Pre-Post Games Business Impact Survey – Sampling 57 
 58 
 59 
REFERENCES 60 
Currie, Jones and Woolley 
16 
 
1. Springett, C., London 2012 Travel Demand Management  in European Transport Conference. 1 
2012: Glasgow, UK. 2 
2. London 2012, Preparing Your Business for the Games, L. Games, Editor. 2011: London, UK. 3 
3. Currie, G. and A. Shalaby, Synthesis of Transport Planning Approaches for the World's Largest 4 
Events. Transport Reviews, 2011. Volume 32, Issue 1, 2012 p. pp 113-136. 5 
4. Currie, G. and A. Delbosc, Assessing Travel Demand Management for the Summer Olympic 6 
Games. Transportation Research Record Journal of the Transportation Research Board 7 
Washington DC, 2011. 2245: p. pp 36-48. 8 
5. Comsis Corporation, Overview of Travel Demand Management Measures. 1994, USAA DOT-T-9 
($-11. 10 
6. Sumner, H., Delivering London 2012:Transport legacy. Proceedings of the Institution of Civil 11 
Engineers - Transport, 2012. Volume 165, Issue TR4: p. pp 267-275. 12 
7. Kassens-Noor, E., Planning Olympic Legacies - Transport dreams and urban realities. 2012, 13 
Abingdon, Oxon and New York: Routledge. 14 
8. Transport for London, London 2012 Games Transport - Performance, Funding and Legacy. 2012, 15 
Transport for London,: London, UK. 16 
9. Bates, I., et al., Games Family Demand Modelling For London 2012 Olympic & Paralympic 17 
Games, in European Transport Conference. 2012: Glasgow, UK. 18 
10. Kershaw, S., Delivering London 2012: Transport programme assurance. Proceedings of the 19 
Institution of Civil Engineers - Transport, 2012. Volume 165, Issue TR4: p. pp 241-248. 20 
11. Butcher, L., London Olympic 2012: transport. 2012, Library of the House of Commons, UK: 21 
London, Uk. 22 
12. Currie, G., The planning and performance of mass transit operating strategies for major events - 23 
The Atlanta Olympic Games and the 1996 Melbourne Formula 1 Grand Prix, in Australian 24 
Institute of Traffic Planning and Management (AITPM) Conference 1998. 1998: Melbourne. 25 
13. Transport for London, Olympic Legacy Monitoring: Personal Travel Behaviour during the Games 26 
- Travel in London Supplementary Report. 2013, Transport for London: London, United Kingdom. 27 
14. Transport for London, Written submission to the London Assembly Transport Committees review 28 
of the Operation of London's transport system during the 2012 Games and the transport legacy. 29 
2012, The London Assembly - Transport Committee: London, UK. 30 
 31 
 32 
